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The Cult as a Social Problem 
Eileen Barker 
 
Jesus was undoubtedly a problem – as were the early Christians, Mohammed and the early 
Muslims, and Wesley and the early Methodists. Today, L. Ron Hubbard and the Church of 
Scientology, Louis Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam, Li Hongzhi and Falun Gong; 
Osama bin Laden and Al Qaida have all been considered a threat not only to their 
individual followers but also to the very fabric of society. Indeed, throughout history, 
religious leaders and the movements to which they have given rise have been perceived to 
be social problems by those who are sure that they know another, truer Truth, and a 
different, better way of life than that proposed by the new religion.   
 
This chapter is concerned not so much with religion per se being considered a problem, but 
with constructions of images of ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’ religions as social problems. Indeed, an 
integral part of these constructions usually implies the contemporaneous existence of 
‘good’ and ‘true’ religion as something to be protected and clearly differentiated from bad 
or false religions, which, in order to avoid confusion, can be denied the label religion and, 
in the popular parlance of the day, branded as cults or (more commonly for French-
speakers) sects.  
 
Cults, sects and new religious movements 
Most lay understandings of the terms ‘cult’ and ‘sect’ start from an assumption that the 
movements are social problems. Exactly what kind of problems they are thought to pose 
may vary, but these can include imputations of heretical beliefs, political intrigue, child 
abuse, criminal activity, financial irregularity, the breaking up of families, sexual 
perversion, medical quackery, and/or the employment of mind control or brainwashing 
techniques.  
 
Social scientists have tended to start from a more neutral perspective, using ‘cult’ and 
‘sect’ as technical terms to refer to religious groups in tension with the wider society. 
Around the early 1970s, however, a number of scholars who were studying organizations 
such as the Children of God, the Church of Scientology, ISKCON (the International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness) and the Unification Church decided to abandon use of 
the terms cult and sect, at least in public discourse, largely because they wanted to avoid 
the negative connotations now widely associated with these words. Instead, they opted for 
the term ‘new religious movement’ (NRM) in the hope that this would provide a generic 
label for the phenomena they were researching without prejudging whether or not they 
were social problems. 
 
There has been (and continues to be) considerable debate among sociologists, historians 
and religious studies specialists as to what exactly constitutes the phenomena that are 
covered by the term NRM. Many of the organizations to which the term is applied are not 
obviously religious, others are not altogether new and yet others are hardly movements. 
However, while not suggesting that any one meaning is more correct than another, it can 
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be argued that a useful approach is to start from a conception of an NRM as a religious or 
spiritual association with a predominantly first-generation membership (Barker 2004).
1
 
 
As one person’s cult is likely to be another person’s religion, sturdy boundaries need to be 
constructed in order to keep the two unambiguously differentiated, and these distinctions 
have had to be defended against anyone who constructs a different boundary, with a 
variety of methods being brought into play to clarify and justify the antagonists’ 
distinctions between a cult and a ‘genuine religion’ (Barker 1991). There have, of course, 
been ‘cult wars’ throughout history. Schisms, alternative interpretations of Scripture, and 
new religions have long been labeled as heresies, and the heretics have frequently died at 
the hands of those who labeled them thus (Jenkins 2000; Versluis 2006). So far as the more 
recent wave of NRMs is concerned, starting in the early 1970s a number of people who, for 
one reason or another, were opposed to the movements began to organize themselves into 
what came to be known generically as the anti-cult movement (ACM).
2
 
 
From an anti-cultist perspective the reason why the NRMs are considered a social 
problem is, quite simply, because the movements are a social problem: their beliefs and 
practices are perceived as anti-social and a danger to individuals and to society. From 
another perspective (especially that of the NRMs themselves), it has been argued that, left 
to their own devices, the movements would not pose any kind of real threat: it is the 
purely the way that they are portrayed by their opponents that results in their being 
perceived as a social problem. Using the language of constructionism, the former position 
sees primary constructions of NRMs (that is, the actions of the members) as the social 
problem; the latter position considers it is secondary constructions of the movements 
which result in their being perceived as a social problem. 
 
Primary and secondary constructions of reality 
All social life involves the construction of images. Social reality itself is a human 
construction. On the one hand, it is a reality in the sense that it exists independently of any 
individual person’s volition – that is, one has to take it into account; one can accept it, try 
to reject it or change it, but, as with a brick wall, one cannot wish it away or ignore it 
without facing the consequences. On the other hand, unlike physical reality, social reality 
exists only in so far as it is recognized by individuals. This means that social reality has 
both an objective and a subjective character; it can, consequently, have a more or less 
recognizably stable structure, yet it is always an on-going, ever-changing process.  
 
NRMs are part of social reality. They are constructed through the actions and interactions 
of their individual members. The founder of a movement and his or her followers create, 
maintain and change the movement through proclaiming their beliefs, giving their 
community a special name, identifying themselves as a more or less distinguishable unit 
                                                 
1
 To adopt for definitional purposes the presence of the independent variable of being in tension with the 
society can be useful for other purposes (Langone 1993, 5; Melton 2004), but would be to beg the question 
in this chapter, when the point is to enquire how new (in the sense of first-generation) religious movements 
may come to be perceived in negative terms. 
2
 For reasons of clarity, in what follows, NRMs will be referred to as ‘movements’ while their opponents’ 
organizations will be referred to as ‘groups’. When the term ‘cult’ is used, this will be indicating that a 
movement is being viewed from the perspective of its opponents. 
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and behaving in ways that reinforce (yet may eventually destroy) the movement as a 
recognizable social entity.
3
 Such actions can be called primary constructions – they 
involve the creation, continuance and demise of the phenomenon itself.  
 
A secondary construction occurs when people (be they participants or non-participants in 
the primary construction of the NRM) not only recognize the existence of the movement, 
but also construct an image of it that can be transmitted to others. There are always some 
features of a social reality that are agreed upon by those who perceive it (otherwise it 
would not be a social reality), but no two individuals’ perceptions are ever exactly the 
same. The differences in their images are not, however, random. The various positions 
(geographical, psychological and social) from which a phenomenon is perceived can 
account in part for systematic differences between alternative depictions of the 
phenomenon. While people may tell the truth, and nothing but the truth, it is impossible for 
anyone to tell the whole truth. Everyone (more or less consciously) selects what is to be 
included or excluded from their picture of reality according to a number of criteria – one 
criterion being what is relevant to their interests. 
 
Thus it is that members of an NRM (who are likely to have an interest in persuading 
people how good their movement is and, probably, in gaining new converts) will select for 
inclusion what they consider (and/or assume others will consider) to be positive features, 
while keeping silent about any skeletons that may be lurking in the cupboard. The 
movement’s opponents, on the other hand, are more likely to select what they consider to 
be bad or harmful actions in their depiction of the movement. In this they may be aided and 
abetted by the media who are anxious to attract and keep the attention of an audience more 
interested in the novel and sensational than in the normal and everyday (Barker 2003). 
 
Rather than arguing that the reason NRMs are perceived as a problem either because of 
their actions or because their opponents see them as such, I shall suggest reasons why it is 
possible that both the NRMs themselves and their opponents’ secondary constructions that 
can be at least partly responsible. Furthermore, it will be suggested, the interaction between 
the different constructors can exacerbate the situation, resulting in the movements 
becoming seen as increasingly problematic. 
 
Potentially problematic characteristics of NRMs 
There are some new religions that have performed what, to most members of society, 
would be unequivocally problematic actions. Take, for example, the apparently senseless 
murders of Sharon Tate and others by members of The Manson Family in 1969. In 1978 
the world was horrified by the murder of Congressman Leo Ryan and his companions and 
the mass suicide/murders at Jonestown, Guyana, by members of the Peoples Temple. The 
1990s saw the suicides and murders of members of the Solar Temple between 1994 and 
1997, the release of sarin gas in the Tokyo underground by members of Aum Shinrikyo in 
1995, and the Heavens Gate suicides in 1997. 
 
                                                 
3
 Drawing heavily on Berger and Luckmann (1967), I have discussed the construction of images of NRMs 
in greater detail elsewhere (Barker 2003). 
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It should, however, be stressed that such atrocities are rare occurrences considering the 
hundreds of law-abiding NRMs that have emerged during the past century or so.
4
 
Generalizing about NRMs is fraught with dangers as nearly every generalization can be 
disproved by at least one of their number. Nonetheless, first-generation religions are likely 
to exhibit certain characteristics merely because they are new in this sense, and several of 
these characteristics can contribute towards antagonistic relationships between the 
movement and non-members, resulting in the former being defined as a social problem.  
 
First, the very fact that the membership of an NRM is made up of converts can in itself 
lead to friction. Converts to any religion tend to be far more enthusiastic, even fanatic, than 
those born into a religion. It is not always easy to reason or even to communicate with 
converts who are enthused by their new-found faith, and who, not having totally 
internalized the beliefs and practices, might do little more than reiterate slogans that mean 
nothing to their listeners – or who may be so preoccupied that they do not even attempt to 
explain their new beliefs and behavior.  
 
Secondly, new religions do not attract a random sample of the population. Although the 
movements may differ from each other in a number of significant ways, each of them 
appeals disproportionately to particular sections of society. While in the past, new religions 
have frequently appealed to the socially, economically and/or politically oppressed, NRMs 
that became visible in the West in the latter part of the twentieth century appealed 
disproportionately, although not exclusively, to well-educated, white young adults. This 
meant that ‘normal’ society was presented with a very visible picture of young people 
abandoning the widely sought-after opportunities they had been given and, instead, 
embracing apparently inexplicable behavior, such as devoting their lives to some foreign 
guru, selling flowers or candles on the street for up to 18 hours a day, living in relative 
poverty, changing their outward appearance, marrying someone who has been chosen for 
them, and possibly severing connections with their former life, including their family and 
friends.  
 
Thirdly, the founders and/or leaders of NRMs are frequently granted charismatic authority 
by their followers. This means that they are relatively unconstrained by either tradition or 
rules, and are, thereby, both unpredictable and unaccountable to anyone except, perhaps, to 
God. This in turn means that they can be seen as more dangerous than those in more 
established leadership positions whose actions can, generally speaking, be anticipated in 
advance. Later, there might develop a hierarchical authority structure with commands 
issuing from the top to the lower levels, giving the movement a strength and control over 
individuals who might be expected to sacrifice themselves for a greater good, which, they 
are told, is God’s will and, therefore, unquestionable. 
 
Fourthly, NRMs may be considered a social problem because many of them declare the 
rest of the world to be the social problem. It is not uncommon for the movements to 
operate with a dichotomous world-view, erecting a sharp boundary between ‘us’ (the 
insiders) and ‘them’ (the outsiders) – a distinction that may be reinforced not only through 
                                                 
4
 Inform www.Inform.ac has information on just under a thousand different movements currently active in 
the UK. 
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shared beliefs and values but also through the employment of a special language, dress, 
diet, music and/or other types of distinguishing behavior. As a result, non-members may be 
encouraged to see the NRM as ‘other’. 
 
Fifthly, as has already been intimated, NRMs have characteristically given rise to 
suspicion, fear and, not infrequently, discrimination and/or persecution. New movements 
offer an alternative way of viewing the world and, quite often, an alternative way of living 
one’s life. It is not surprising that they are unlikely to be welcomed by those with a vested 
interest in preserving the status quo – or even by those who accept that statistically normal, 
taken-for-granted beliefs and practices are both ethically correct and desirable. Early 
Christians were thrown to the lions; Cathars were burned at the stake; Bahá’ís have been 
executed in Iran and Ahmadis in Pakistan; Jehovah’s Witnesses were gassed in Auschwitz; 
and there are numerous examples of NRMs being imprisoned, tortured and put to death in 
parts of today’s world (US Commission 2009; Pew 2009). In what follows, however, it is 
some of the more subtle methods of discrimination that will be considered – methods 
which are, nonetheless, directed towards creating a perception of the movements not only 
as ‘different’ but also as a social problem. 
 
But first it should be added that a sixth and often ignored characteristic of NRMs is that 
they are likely to change far more rapidly and fundamentally than older, more traditional 
religions. Inevitable demographic changes occur with the arrival of second and subsequent 
generations; converts typically lose some of their initial enthusiasms as they mature; 
founding leaders age and eventually die, which frequently results in the authority structure 
becoming more traditional and bureaucratic and, thereby, more predictable and 
accountable. The movements’ beliefs may become less sharply defined and more open to 
qualification, and the strong boundary distinguishing members from non-members may 
become more permeable with greater interaction taking place between the members and 
the wider society. 
 
The Anti-cult Movement (ACM) 
Organized opposition to contemporary NRMs in the West arose early in the 1970s. It 
started with the concerns of parents of converts to the Children of God, a branch of the 
‘Jesus Movement’ that had emerged during the 1960s. These parents, together with Ted 
Patrick, the originator of forcible ‘deprogramming’, founded FREECOG (Free the 
Children of God), which was to be the first formal cult-watching group in the United States 
(Patrick 1976; Shupe and Bromley 1980, 89ff). Before long there appeared a cluster of 
other groups similarly concerned about the practices of NRMs.
5
 The composition of the 
ACM has varied; in its early days it consisted predominantly of middle-class parents who 
were in a position to protest and to be heard, but soon the parents were joined by 
professionals such as lawyers, deprogrammers, therapists, mental health practitioners and, 
increasingly, former members. 
 
                                                 
5
 Around the same time, there was also the growth of the counter-cult movement (CCM) which, while 
overlapping to some extent with the ACM, was more concerned with exposing what its members 
considered to be the theologically incorrect beliefs of NRMs (Cowan 2003). 
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The Cult Awareness Network (CAN) was formed from a merger of several small groups 
and became the foremost anti-cult coalition until 1996, when it was bankrupted as the 
result of an illegal kidnapping case (Scott v. Ross) in which it was found guilty of referring 
a parent to the deprogrammer (Shupe and Darnell 2006, 180-188). The subsequent 
purchase of the name of CAN by the Church of Scientology left the American Family 
Foundation (AFF) as the largest cult-watching group in North America. Founded in 1979 
as a research and education organization (Langone 2002, 5), AFF membership had had 
considerable overlap with CAN so far as its Board and attendance at conferences were 
concerned (Shupe and Darnell 2006, 115), but the AFF was less strident than CAN, and, as 
an organization, has not promoted forcible deprogramming, preferring instead the non-
violent ‘exit counseling’ and, later, ‘thought reform counseling’ (Giambalvo et al 1998). 
 
Meanwhile, concern about the movements had also been growing in other parts of the 
world. Some of the most active opposition to NRMs in Western Europe has been in 
France, which, having established a number of anti-cult groups in the 1970s,
6
 
commissioned government reports on the perceived problem, first in the early 1980s, then 
again in the mid 1990s. This second report was the cause of considerable controversy 
(Introvigne and Melton 1996), not least because it contained a list of 172 sects which were 
presumed to be dangerous due their exhibiting at least one of ten characteristics. These 
included mental destabilization, exorbitant financial demands, breaking with one’s original 
environment, indoctrination of children, anti-social speech, disturbances of law and order, 
and infiltrating the public authorities (Guyard 1995, 15). Needless to say, it was widely 
remarked that most traditional religions could find themselves included under such a 
definition. 
 
Since its publication there have been numerous allegations by movements listed in the 
report that they have suffered from discrimination merely on the grounds that they were on 
the list (Lheureux et al 2000). Two years later, the Belgian government produced a report 
that had attached to it a list of 184 movements which included the Society of Friends 
(Quakers) and the YWCA (Young Women’s Christian Association). Although this report 
explicitly stated that the list was only of names brought up in evidence and did not imply 
that the commission considered the movement to be a sect or, a fortiori, dangerous, the 
very fact that a movement is on the list has led to occasions when it has allegedly been 
discriminated against and/or assumed to be a social problem. 
 
Regardless of the status of any particular movement, it was clear that both the French and 
Belgian governments considered the movements as a whole to constitute a social problem, 
and accordingly they both established organizations that would monitor the movements’ 
actions. The French organization is currently named MIVILUDES,
7
 and the Belgian one is 
known as the CIAOSN.
8
  
 
                                                 
6
 ADFI, the most influential of these, was founded in 1974, then, uniting the growing number of branches, 
it became known under the umbrella term of UNADFI (National Union of the Association for the Defense 
of Families and the Individual) in 1982. 
7
 Inter-Ministerial Mission of Vigilance and Fight against Sectarianism; http://www.miviludes.gouv.fr/ 
8
 Information and Advice Center on Harmful Sectarian Organizations; http://www.ciaosn.be/ 
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By the end of the 1980s, small groups had surfaced throughout all Western Europe. In 
England, for example, the first anti-cult group, FAIR (Family Action Information and 
Rescue) had been founded in 1976,
9
 and further groups followed during the 1980s. There 
was also a growing number of groups in Australia, Japan and other Asian locations. Then, 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent flood of movements 
taking advantage of the new freedoms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
worried parents and the traditional churches that had been repressed under atheistic 
regimes organized themselves to fight the cults, which became widely perceived as a threat 
to the new post-communist society. In this they were encouraged by Western anti-cultists 
and their literature (Shterin and Richardson 2000); some were also eager to play a role as 
members of FECRIS, an umbrella organization for European anti-cultists, founded largely 
through the endeavors of UNADFI in Paris in 1994.
10
 
 
State Attitudes towards NRMs 
The success of the ACM in lobbying support from those in positions of power has varied 
from time to time and from place to place. In some societies their existence is well-nigh 
irrelevant, but elsewhere the evidence of ‘cult-watching groups’ can tip the balance one 
way or the other. Societies governed by the principles of atheistic socialism are unlikely to 
consider NRMs a particular problem because all religions are considered a social problem; 
in Saudi Arabia, all religions apart from the state religion are considered a social problem. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the USA has a Constitution forbidding the government to 
discriminate between religions. 
 
There are, however, many states that do discriminate between religions, sometimes giving 
special privileges, sometimes imposing restrictions on minority or unpopular religions. In 
France, legislation has been introduced clearly indicating that the state feels the need to 
protect its citizens from the social problem of dangerous sects (Altglas 2008, 56-7; Rolland 
2003). Sometimes legislative discrimination is directed towards a named NRM, as is the 
case in China where Falun Gong, explicitly defined as a social problem, has been banned 
as an ‘evil cult’ and practitioners have to undergo ‘re-education’ (Ownby 2008; Palmer 
2007).  
 
Rather than elaborating further on the structural or organizational aspects of the ACM 
(Altglas 2008; Beckford 1985; Chryssides 1999; Shupe and Bromley 1980; 1994; Shupe 
and Darnell 2006), or the varied reactions by governments and in courts of law 
(Richardson 2004), what follows will concentrate on the construction of cult images as one 
(but, it must be recognized, only one) of the methods employed by the NRMs’ opponents 
in their attempts to persuade others (and, perhaps, themselves) that the movements are, in 
one way or another, a social problem.  
 
                                                 
9
FAIR changed its name to Family Action Information and Resource in 1994, when it was decided that the 
illegal practice of involuntary deprogramming carried out by some of its members was no longer 
acceptable.   
10
 Fédération Européenne des Centres de Recherche et d'Information sur le Sectarisme. Member 
organizations are listed at: http://www.fecris.org/   
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Constructing images of NRMs as a social problem 
It needs to be stressed that the issue being addressed here is not whether one set of images 
is superior to another set. I have argued elsewhere (Barker 2003) that the methodology of 
the social sciences can result in more reliable (objective) secondary constructions than 
other methods. It should, however, be noted that objectivity is not necessarily the main 
concern of all secondary constructors, just as it should be noted there are those who are 
associated with the anti-cultist camp who espouse a scientific approach, and that there are 
academics whose work falls lamentably short of the standards of science.   
 
Just as it is impossible to generalize about NRMs, it is impossible to generalize about the 
ACM. One distinction that can be drawn, however, is that between those whose main 
concern is helping the people (such as relatives and former members) who have 
experienced harm because of direct or indirect contact with the movements, and those 
whose main concern is to expose the movements as harmful cults – a position that may be 
motivated by the experience of personal suffering, a firm conviction that any deviation 
from a socially accepted norm is problematic, or, possibly, financial interests in, say, a 
lucrative deprogramming practice. Generally speaking, members of the first group are 
more likely to want their secondary constructions to reflect the primary constructions so 
that they can better understand and deal with the problems, whilst members of the latter 
group are more likely to want to emphasize only negative features and may resort to 
various ruses to ensure that their images unambiguously depict cults as a social problem.  
 
Language, brainwashing and mind control 
As has already been suggested, one of the most common and effective means by which an 
NRM is depicted as a social problem is simply through using the term ‘cult’. There are, 
however, many other ways that language can convey a negative image. Nouns, adjectives 
and adverbs can all contain evaluative overtones, and grammar, particularly the use of the 
passive tense, can support imputations of brainwashing or mind control. “I converted to a 
new religion” becomes “he was recruited into a cult”; “I’ve chosen a life of sacrifice and 
dedication to God” becomes “she’s being exploited by the guru”.11  
 
The brainwashing debate is one of the more heated battles in the cult wars. Parents who 
saw their (adult) children apparently change overnight into completely different people 
embracing strange beliefs and life-styles found the suggestion that they had been subjected 
to brainwashing or mind-control techniques the only comprehensible explanation. The 
theory absolved both relatives and ‘victims’ from any responsibility; it also justified the 
use of forcible deprogramming as it was alleged that the victims were unable to escape by 
themselves but needed rescuing (Patrick 1976, 70, 276). On the other hand, NRM scholars 
have found that, although many of the NRMs certainly try to influence potential converts 
by various means, the vast majority of those subjected to such practices have resisted the 
pressure – and the majority of those who have joined have tended to leave of their own 
accord within a relatively short period (Barker 1994; Bromley and Richardson 1983). With 
the passage of time and further research, more sophisticated understandings of the 
processes involved in joining the movements have been embraced by both ‘sides’, but, 
                                                 
11
 NRM scholars have been accused of dismissing the testimonies of former members by labelling these as 
apostates’ atrocity tales (Bromley 1998; Langone 1993, 32). 
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perpetuated in large part by the popular media, the metaphor of brainwashing continues to 
form an enduring element in the popular image of cults. 
 
Generalizing 
Indeed, the role of the media cannot be over-estimated. Analyses of ‘cult stories’ have 
repeatedly uncovered ways in which NRMs are portrayed as social problems by, for 
example, including frequent references to unrelated ‘suicide cults’, with vivid pictures of 
the tragedies accompanying the article (Beckford 1999; van Driel and Richardson 1988). 
Thus a programme about Soka Gakkai in the UK, which had not succeeded in unearthing 
any particularly problematic details, started and ended with footage of firemen removing 
bodies from the Tokyo underground after the release of sarin gas by members of Aum 
Shinrikyo – an NRM which, apart from its Japanese origins, bears no similarity to Soka 
Gakkai. 
 
This is a variant of the inductive logic that, if one member of a class of phenomena is 
known to have committed a criminal act, it can be assumed that all members of that class 
have done likewise. It is not always necessary for anyone explicitly to suggest that all cults 
are guilty of crimes; the very fact that the media report a crime when it has been committed 
by a cultist can result in the reader/listener/watcher concluding there is a strong connection 
between cults and crime. They are less likely to notice that the media do not report the 
religious affiliation of Anglicans when they commit crimes, yet the Anglican crime rate 
might be twice that of NRMs. A slightly different assumption is that an action that is true 
of NRMs is peculiar to NRMs but not the rest of the population. Thus it may be 
‘discovered’ that members of NRMs sometimes cried as children, which, while 
undoubtedly true, is hardly peculiar to those who join NRMs. 
 
Imputing negative motives and double standards  
Both sides in the cult wars have a tendency to define their own actions as being carried out 
for the best of motives, while imputing the worst of motives to their opponents. Even 
(perhaps especially) when NRMs perform what would normally be regarded as ‘good 
works’, these may be dismissed by the ACM as nothing but devious PR enterprises 
designed to gain (illegitimate) legitimacy. A related practice is to condemn actions 
performed by the ‘other side’ while the very same action performed by one’s own side is 
described as justifiable or even praiseworthy. The accounts by Ted Patrick (1976) of 
deprogrammings he conducted provide copious examples of this strategy, ranging from the 
use of deception to the use of physical violence.  
 
Labeling and deviance amplification 
Criminologists have long recognized that labeling people in a negative way can result in a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, encouraging them to behave as they have been labeled (Becker 
1963). They have also observed what has come to be known as a spiral of ‘deviance 
amplification’ when a society’s negative reaction towards a movement that is perceived as 
deviant may result in the movement becoming more deviant, thereby provoking further 
condemnation – and so on … (Young 1973, 350). Escalating hostility between the FBI and 
the Branch Davidians, and between the Chinese People’s Republic and Falun Gong, 
provide examples of this kind of negative polarization within the ‘cult scene’ (Bromley and 
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Melton 2002). It should, however, be noted that the spiral can work in the opposite 
direction, decreasing tensions through mutual accommodation. 
 
Protecting images  
ACM activists need not only to construct but also to defend their constructions in a market 
place of competing images (Barker 2003). Part of their defensive strategy can involve 
challenging conflicting depictions, especially those of NRM scholars whom they may try 
to dismiss by labeling them as ‘cult-apologists’. The final section of this chapter offers 
examples of  some of the ways those who are concerned to defend their images of cults as 
a social problem do so by attacking what they consider to be ‘the other side’. Several 
illustrations are of a personal nature, if only because my work has invoked a formidable 
array of examples! 
 
Whilst publications by NRM scholars are frequently ignored, there are two ways in which 
they do get ‘used’ by their antagonists in the cult wars: data deemed to be positive (or even 
neutral) are taken to ‘prove’ the scholar is a cult-apologist; data deemed to be negative are 
taken to show that even cult-apologists have to admit that the cults are a social problem. 
 
This kind of ‘tails-you-lose, heads-I-win’ approach was adopted by an ACM reviewer 
when she reported, “the author focuses almost exclusively on her positive reframing and 
apologetic reframing [of the movements]” then concluded:  
Ultimately, I suppose we can thank Palmer for giving us more ammunition in the academic (and 
sociocultural) battle between those of us who believe that such groups are potentially harmful … 
and those who line up with the cult apologists. (Lalich 1997, 159-61) 
Sometimes what has been written is taken completely out of context. In an article designed 
to demonstrate that ‘apologist NRM scholars’ have collaborated with the movements by 
presenting only positive images, one critic wrote: 
Barker (1991, p. 11) noted the ‘considerable economic advantages to be gained from being defined 
as a religion’, but has not suggested that this may motivate any specific NRMs or their leaders. 
(Beit-Hallahmi 2001, 57) 
In fact, the entire paragraph from which the citation was lifted was devoted to suggesting 
that very thing.  
 
A posting on a cult-watching website offers an interesting example of selective perception. 
It consists of an account of a lecture I had given, but bears little relation to my actual 
position or to what I had said, including a complaint that I had presented “a graphic image 
of the bombing of an ISKCON temple [but] no images of atrocities committed by cultic 
groups”12 In fact, my PowerPoint presentation had contained two graphic images of dead 
bodies in Jonestown; one of the Branch Davidians compound in flames; a collage of bodies 
in the Tokyo underground and Aum Shinrikyo’s leader, Asahara; and a photo of the 
blazing Twin Towers. It was only after showing these that I had shown the picture of the 
bombed ISKCON temple – which was followed by a further picture of bunk beds 
containing the bodies of Heaven’s Gate members who had committed suicide. 
 
                                                 
12
 http://dialogueireland.wordpress.com/2009/11/06/question-and-answers-from-maynooth-conference-
mick-farrell-2-eileen-barker/ 
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I have no reason to believe that the complainant was deliberately lying. I suspect he just 
had not remembered my showing the other pictures, which would have merely confirmed 
his taken-for-granted dichotomous worldview of ‘cults=bad vs. rest-of-society=good’. A 
proponent of cognitive dissonance theory might conclude that the inclusion of the 
unfamiliar ISKCON picture threatened his picture of reality and, to protect this, he had to 
reject the apparent inconsistency by proclaiming I was a cult apologist who presented only 
information defending the cults (Festinger 1956). 
 
Perhaps less forgivable are occasions when complainants presumably know that they are 
fabricating the evidence. On an internet discussion group an avowed anti-cultist has 
attacked one of my books (Barker 1994), stating that I used methodological techniques I 
had explicitly not used, and giving a ridiculously inaccurate account of my findings. When 
another list member challenged the woman’s statements, she defended herself by saying 
that she had not read the book as, she claimed, she had tried to get it from Amazon ‘but 
even a used copy is more than $100.’ On checking Amazon that same day, I saw several 
copies on offer for under $5. 
 
Then there are those who apparently consider any direct familiarity with my work would 
involve contamination. One of my students, attending a FAIR meeting, found herself being 
told about the terrible things I had written. The student, somewhat surprised, asked her 
informant where she had read these things, whereupon the woman replied in a shocked 
voice that she wouldn’t dream of reading any of my work. 
 
One of the criticisms sometimes leveled against NRM scholars is that they are too 
academic; they cannot understand the situation because they have never lost a child to a 
cult.
13
 Several years ago I was asked to write a pamphlet for the Catholic Truth Society 
about the new religions. This I did, but it was rejected because, I was told, it was too 
objective. Another Catholic publication, The Clergy Review, did publish an article I wrote 
for them, whereupon the then-Chair of FAIR telephoned the editor demanding the right “to 
redress the balance as Barker’s article was so balanced!” When I asked another of FAIR’s 
Chairmen to give me examples of errors in my publications, he responded that he didn’t 
think I was wrong, just that by presenting two or more points of view I was “muddying the 
waters”. It was, he said, much easier for the FAIR membership if they had an 
uncomplicated picture of the situation.  
 
Concluding remarks 
‘Cult wars’ are likely to continue so long as there are new religions. What has been 
suggested in this chapter is that if we want to understand why there is a widespread 
perception of cults as a social problem it is necessary to study not only the NRMs, but also 
the various interests, methods and techniques involved in secondary constructions of the 
movements. This chapter has briefly introduced the complexity of the constructions of 
social life – but there is much, much more to be written on the subject  
 
                                                 
13
 I have been greeted with this criticism on numerous occasions, particularly since founding Inform 
(www.Inform.ac), with the express aim of helping those who were seeking reliable information about the 
movements (http://www.inform.ac/aboutInform.pdf/). 
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